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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City, 
University of London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue 
focussed leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other 
key market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into 
the world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from 
financing to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
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Overview
n invasion of the Crimea, interference 
in the Ukraine, a large list of 
companies blacklisted overseas, 
concerns over the openness of the next 
election and accusations of interference in 
the US presidential election. Not a good time 
to invest in Russia then. But Russia is a 
country of vast natural resources, is the 
world’s largest nation by geographic site, 
has a large population (144 million) and has 
one of the cheapest stock markets in the 
world (trading on just 7x historic earnings). 
So, do the latter attractions outweigh the 
opening issues? 
This report investigates the relationship 
between changes in political risk levels and 
the long-term success of cross-border 
acquisitions in Russia. 
First, by focusing on Russia specifically, it 
fills a geographic gap in current political risk 
and FDI research, which has mainly focused 
on emerging countries as a group or on 
developed economies. Second, this study 
aims to examine the influence of a wide 
array of political variables on M&A 
performance in Russia, rather than the 
impact of the single political risk factor.  
Our analysis includes twelve independent 
political risk variables from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the period 
1998-2016 and five control variables, 
accounting for firm and sector-specific 
characteristics and changes in economic 
and financial risk. For comparison, the 
analysis was conducted with time frames of 
both one and two years before and after 
acquisitions.  
Just one of the eleven political risks 
has an impact in each time frame 
Our most significant finding is that of the 
eleven political risks tested only external 
conflict (in the medium-term model) and 
corruption (in the long-term model) have an 
impact. Also noteworthy is the lack of impact 
of financial risk. Predictably economic risk 
does have an impact, but not in the long-
term model.  
Some surprising results 
Findings showed that an improvement in 
economic risk ratings is negatively 
associated with performance for companies 
whose ROA grew after the acquisition, and 
positively for those whose ROA decreased. 
The former could be safer, ‘high quality’ 
deals which don’t need the tailwind of an 
economic boost, the latter ‘strategic deals’ 
expressly carried out for that tailwind. 
Improvement in external conflict risk ratings 
was positively associated with performance 
for companies whose ROA has increased 
after the acquisition, and negatively for 
those whose ROA. 
The second model, considering ROA 
changes two years before and after the 
acquisition, showed corruption as the only 
significant political risk variable. An 
improvement in corruption risk ratings was 
negatively associated with performance for 
companies whose ROA increased after the 
acquisition, and positively for those whose 
ROA decreased. This suggests that the 
former type of ‘successful’ companies 
benefits from a less transparent context and 
may apply nonmarket strategies to improve 
performance, while the latter type sees 
corruption as detrimental to post-acquisition 
success and are looking for a long-term 
corruption decrease to be an element 
contributing to the business turnaround.  
The insignificant predictive values obtained 
with the models in this report’s analysis 
suggest that rather than being major 
determinants of M&A success in Russia, 
political variables act as moderators 
between strategic motives and post- 
acquisition integration, and performance. 
The larger responsibility for success seems 
to remain with the acquirers themselves and 
their post-acquisition integration strategy.
A 
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Background
hile Russia’s  current president  has  
at  times  been  known  to  express  
a  strong commitment to 
international cooperation and growth, 
spreading specks of hope for international 
investors, the jury is still out on whether the 
country’s situation has seen any actual 
improvement in recent years. Russia’s political 
instability, both internal and external, has long 
been perceived as a considerable investment 
deterrent. Nevertheless, the PRS Group who 
publish the ICRG found that Russia’s country 
risk has improved from “Low” in 2011 to 
“Moderate” in 2017. However, the OECD’s 
latest Russian survey (2014) puts Russia 
behind OECD and BRICS peers in terms of 
corruption perception, even though its overall 
score has improved since 2010.  
Perhaps more worryingly, Russia scores much 
worse than fellow countries in terms of the rule 
of law and the independence of the judiciary 
system, and exhibits a particularly poor 
governance quality, which is highly detrimental 
to the business climate. This perhaps explains 
why Russia ranks 34th in the 2017 M&A 
Attractiveness Index published by the M&A 
Research Centre at Cass Business School1. It 
has, however, risen five places in the past five 
years. 
State ownership in the economy remains 
unusually significant compared to other OECD 
and BRIC countries, and, even though an 
ambitious plan to privatize around 1,500 
companies was adopted in 2010, most of it 
has been held off due to unfavourable market 
conditions. Agency problems are therefore 
widespread and are seen by some as the 
driving force behind the negative performance 
of acquisitions in Russia (Bertrand and 
Betschinger, 20122). While this is unlikely to 
change overnight, some encouraging trends 
should be noted. In fact, the World Bank’s 
                                                          
1 M&A Attractiveness Index 2017, M&A Research Centre 
Working Paper Series, February 2018. 
2 Bertrand, O. and Betschinger, M., Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 2012 
2017 3  study on the ease of doing business 
ranked the Russian Federation 40th, up from 
120th in 2012, even as Mr Putin has 
emphasised his commitment to driving the 
country to 20th place by 2020. 
Political risk and M&A – current views 
The relationship between political risk on M&A 
activity remains ambiguous and three main 
conclusions emerge: 
Numerous studies have confirmed the positive 
impact of political stability, well-established 
institutions and governance efficiency on 
corporate investment decisions and post-deal 
outcomes. Political risk was found to decrease 
the acquirer’s profitability potential by 
increasing M&A costs, such as permits and 
government approvals (Bertrand and 
Betschinger, 2012), while discouraging further 
deals due to underlying high uncertainty and 
corruption (Dikova et al., 20164). Companies 
entering a foreign market via M&A sometimes 
face strong political opposition, especially in 
strategic sectors. This was illustrated by the 
strong political opposition to M&A seen by 
Chinese firms in the US. 
Conversely, Hur et al. (2011)5 have considered 
cross-border acquisitions in developing 
countries and concluded that, while control of 
corruption and government effectiveness had 
a limited positive effect on M&A inflows, 
political stability did not exhibit a significant 
relationship with M&A levels. In addition, other 
studies found that changes in political stability 
in developing countries had no influence over 
FDI surges or falls. 
Finally, some studies outlined positive effects 
of an increase in political risk on M&A. By 
increasing their political contributions before 
                                                          
3 World Bank, ‘Doing business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All’, 
World Bank, 2017 
0948-4 
4 Dikova, D. et al, International Journal of Emerging Markets, 
2016 
5 Hur, J., Parinduri, R.A. and Riyanto, Y.E., Pacific Economic 
Review, 2011 
W 
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and after the merger or acquisition, companies 
have been able to better mitigate M&A 
regulatory risks. Studies on the energy sector 
concluded that companies used nonmarket 
strategies in the form of contributions to 
political campaigns to protect M&A generated 
rents from dissipation by regulators. In the 
same vein, (Chen and Xu, 20147) considered 
M&A in China and found that democratization 
deters Chinese investment, as it infers higher 
levels of “industry protection and greater 
power of trade unions”, which constitutes an 
institutional risk for Chinese firms. 
 
 While the impact of political risk factors is 
clearly particularly relevant for Russia and is 
often perceived as one of the key barriers to 
foreign investment in the country, studies on 
the subject remain divided. An understanding 
of the Russian risk landscape would help 
foreign companies protect their interests by 
hedging against the appropriate risks. 
Although many studies have focused on the 
impact of cultural and political factors on the 
likelihood of observing M&A activity in a given 
country, few have considered the impact of 
these variables on M&A performance. Note 
that the pattern of M&A acquisitions by year in 
our Russian sample is similar to that of most 
countries, showing typical procyclicality (see 
Figure 1 below). 
 
Figure 1: Russian acquisitions in our sample by year 
  
Source: Cass Business School  
                                                          
7 Chen, F. and Xu, Y., Quality and Quantity, 2014 
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Our findings 
n the Appendix you can see the details 
behind our final sample of 112 cross-border 
acquisitions which had an effective / 
unconditional date between 01/01/1998 and 
01/01/2015. The geographic range of the 
acquirers is broad as can be seen in Figure 2 
at the end of this section, with no one country 
representing more than 11% of the deals. 
The results of the regression analysis are 
shown in Figure 3 at the end of this section. 
The clearest finding is that of the eleven 
political risks tested only external conflict (in 
the medium-term model) and corruption (in the 
long-term model) have an impact. Also 
noteworthy is the lack of impact of financial 
risk. Predictably economic risk does have an 
impact, but not in the long-term model. As you 
can see in Figure 3 the other potential drivers 
we tested for did not have a significant impact. 
The directional results obtained offered 
interesting insights, but were interpreted with 
caution given the transformation performed on 
ROA. As the squaring of the ROA change 
removed straightforward indications of the 
directionality of the change, results were 
interpreted considering two scenarios for each 
model (Figure 4 at the end of this section): 
- ROA change was positive 
- ROA change was negative 
Taking the drivers in turn: 
Economic risk as a performance 
driver? 
The PRS Group includes the following 
components in its economic risk rating: 
- GDP per head 
- Real GDP growth 
- Annual inflation rate 
- Budget balance as a percentage of GDP 
- Current account as a percentage of GDP 
When ΔROA (t+/-1) < 0, better economic 
conditions were associated with enhanced (a 
smaller fall) post- acquisition performance. For 
companies whose ROA decreased after the 
acquisition, this could be interpreted as a 
difficult / strategic deal that in the short term 
may struggle but is an intended beneficiary of 
Russian economic improvement.  
When ΔROA (t+/-1) > 0, the relationship 
between ROA change and economic risk 
improvement was an inverse one. Findings 
suggesting that for firms that have seen an 
increase in ROA after the acquisition, a 
decrease in economic risk was associated with 
a decrease in ROA change may seem 
counterintuitive. However, these could be 
safer, ‘high quality’ deals which don’t need the 
tail wind of an economic boost.  
For all values of ΔROA, it is particularly 
interesting that economic risk was only 
significant in the medium term. As numerous 
acquisitions in Russia are carried out for 
restructuring purposes, this phenomenon may 
be explained by the fact that the acquirer is 
likely to take advantage of M&A to reshuffle 
assets to his advantage in the first year after 
the acquisition (Bertrand and Betschinger). 
This is also in line with Quer et al. (2011)9 and 
Bunyaratavej and Hahn (2007) 10 , who have 
found Chinese investors to be eager to invest 
in high-risk countries to buy an asset cheaply, 
while gaining a first-mover advantage. After 
the first year, however, the acquirer would 
have reshuffled assets and taken steps to 
hedge against economic risk exposure, which 
would therefore have a weaker impact on ROA 
performance change. 
External conflict: a recipe for failure? 
The PRS Group includes several 
subcomponents in its external conflict 
category: 
- War 
- Cross-border conflict 
                                                          
9 Quer, D., Claver, E. and Rienda, L., Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 2011 
10 Bunyaratavej, K. and Hahn, E.D., AIB 2007 Annual Meeting, 
2007 
I 
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- Foreign pressures (diplomatic pressures, 
trade restrictions, sanctions, territorial 
disputes, etc.) 
For ΔROA (t+/-1) > 0, the magnitude of 
positive ROA change after the acquisition 
increased as external conflict ratings improve, 
suggesting a positive association with 
performance. These findings are consistent 
with existing literature. Given Russia’s recent 
history of cross-border conflicts, including 
Ukraine and Georgia, as well as subsequent 
international pressures, including sanctions 
and trade bans, such results are to be 
expected. 
For ΔROA (t+/-1) < 0, it is harder to offer an 
explanation as to why an increase in external 
conflict risk ratings would be associated with a 
negative impact on post-acquisition 
performance change. Perhaps the increased 
FDI is drawn to businesses with a clearer path 
to improved performance? 
For all values of ΔROA (t+/-1), it is interesting 
to note that external conflict ratings are only 
significant in the medium term, but not in the 
long term. This could partly be explained by 
the fact that recent conflicts involving Russia, 
with the notable exception of the Syrian 
operations, have been relatively short-lived. 
Companies would therefore only need to deal 
with the initial shock of the conflict, which 
would most likely subside within a one-year 
time frame. After that, firms’ hedging strategies 
would allow the mitigation of risks posed by 
subsequent sanctions. As such events have 
been reasonably frequent in Russia in recent 
years, it is most likely that companies would 
have such strategies in place, which would 
explain why acquirers would be less exposed 
to external conflict risks in the long term. 
Corruption in the long term: friend or 
foe? 
For ΔROA (t+/-2) < 0, findings showed that an 
improvement in corruption ratings was 
associated with a more favourable change in 
ROA for companies that have seen a decrease 
in their ROA after the acquisition (i.e., a 
smaller fall). This is consistent with studies that 
found corruption to be detrimental to the 
business environment and FDI inflows. 
Interestingly, for ΔROA (t+/-2) > 0, the findings 
were consistent with Helmy’s (2013)11 “helping 
hand” theory of corruption. This would suggest 
that companies which have seen an 
improvement in their ROA after the acquisition 
tend to benefit from lower degrees of 
transparency. Quer et al. suggested that 
higher levels of political risk did not discourage 
Chinese investors, who were more likely to 
perceive it as an opportunity. 
Investors may prefer an environment where 
they can impact governmental decision-
making (Elfakhani and Mackie, 201512). They 
may resort to strategies such as those outlined 
by Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2014) 13 , 
increasing political contributions around the 
time of specific M&A or on a per-need basis. In 
addition, O’Donnell (1988) 14  pointed out that 
foreign investors and autocrats may often 
share a privileged relationship, as autocrats 
shield foreign capital to reap the overall 
economic benefits of FDI. Adding to this, other 
studies found that FDI inflows could be lower 
in more transparent regions, as corruption 
allows multinational companies to enjoy 
certain advantages.  
Finally, returning to the overall study, the 
regressions’ coefficients suggested that the 
variance in ROA attributable to corruption is 
much greater than that attributable to 
economic or external conflict risks, which 
highlights the potential importance of this 
factor in the M&A process. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Helmy, H.E., International Review of Applied Economics, 2013 
12 Elfakhani, S. and Mackie, W., Competitiveness Review, 2015 
13 Holburn, G.L.F. and Vanden Burgh, R.G., Strategic 
Management Journal, 2014 
14 O’Donnell, G., Quality and Quantity, 1988 
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Figure 2: Home country of acquirers in our sample 
 
Source: Cass Business School  
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Figure 3: Results of regression analysis 
 
Model 1 is the analysis measuring from one year prior to acquisition to one year after, while Model 2 is the analysis measuring 
from two years prior to acquisition to two years after. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Beta t-value  Beta t-value Status* 
Acquirer sector -.092 -.924  .117 1.139 Excluded 
Same industry acq./target -.086 -0.862  -.091 -.860 Excluded 
Europe .131 1.323  -.077 -.751 Excluded 
Asia Pacific -.085 -.857  .123 1.216 Excluded 
Economic risk -.454 -3.609**  .010 .095 Included - 1  
Financial risk .188 .979  -.032 -.289 Excluded 
Government stability .087 .493  .177 1.735 Excluded 
Socioeconomic conditions -.063 -.530  .109 0.943 Excluded 
Investment profile .032 .320  .081 .764 Excluded 
Internal conflict .063 .603  -.047 -.446 Excluded 
External conflict .260 2.066**  -.150 -1.481 Included - 1  
Corruption -.093 -.939  -.262 -2.575** Included - 2  
Military in politics -.062 -.624  .157 1.195 Excluded 
Religious tensions -.100 -1.006  -.024 -.096 Excluded 
Law and order -.097 -.979  .136 .907 Excluded 
Ethnic tensions -.088 -.876  -.074 -.338 Excluded 
Democratic accountability .059 .567  .035 .341 Excluded 
 
Source: Cass Business School 
 
* Indicates whether the variable was significant, warranting inclusion in either Model 1 or Model 2. 
** Significance at 5% level 
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Figure 4: Result interpretation summary 
 
Model ROA Independent Impact on                   Interpretation  
 Variables                    performance 
 
M1 
 
At 
 
t-/+1 
 
If ΔROA < 0   Better Eco conditions Decrease ROA2 The negative value of ROA 
                                                                                                  becomes smaller, indicating 
Better performance    an improved performance. 
 
 
 
Increase  Increase ROA2           The negative value of ROA                                    
Ext Conflict rating   becomes larger, indicating a 
Poorer performance    poorer performance. 
 
At 
 
t-/+1 
 
If ΔROA > 0 Better Eco conditions   Decrease ROA2 The positive value of ROA 
                                                                                                  becomes smaller, indicating a 
Poorer performance   poorer performance. 
 
Increase  Increase ROA2 The positive value of ROA                                    
Ext Conflict rating  becomes larger, indicating an 
Better performance    improved performance. 
 
M2 
 
At 
 
t-/+2 
 
If ΔROA <0 Increase Corr. score   Decrease ROA2 The negative value of ROA 
                                                                                                  becomes smaller, indicating 
                                                                 Better performance    an improved performance. 
 
At 
 
t-/+2 
 
If ΔROA > 0 Increase Corr. score  Decrease ROA2 The positive value of ROA 
                                                                                                  becomes smaller, indicating                                                                                                                                                                                
p                                                            Poorer performance     poorer performance.   
 
Source: Cass Business School 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
xcept for medium-term economic risk, 
all control variables used were found to 
be insignificant. A plausible 
explanation for this is the fact that the success 
of acquisitions is rather due to a proper 
implementation of post-acquisition strategies 
and a successful navigation through the 
integration phase (as per Hopkins, 2008 15 ), 
rather than country, firm or sector 
characteristics. In addition, the insignificance 
of financial risk is in line with findings by 
Hayakawa et al. (2012)16. 
These findings were generally consistent with 
research from Burger and Ianchovichina 
(2017) 17 , who did not find any relationship 
between political variables and M&A likelihood, 
even though this does contradict the widely 
accepted belief that the success of an 
acquisition in Russia is contingent on political 
risk factors. 
Equally, Elfakhani and Mackie (2015) did not 
find political factors to be significant 
determinants of Russian FDI inflows. 
This paper has implications for investors 
considering an expansion into Russia. While 
awareness of host country risk levels is 
important, these risks seem to play a 
secondary role in post-acquisition success. 
This would suggest that acquirers would obtain 
better results by practicing a coherent 
acquisition and integration strategy, rather 
than being overly focused on political risks. As 
such, some companies, arguably those 
already successful in their post-acquisition 
results that saw their ROA grow, could even 
benefit from the opportunities presented by 
political and economic risks by adapting their 
market and nonmarket strategies accordingly, 
thus driving their performance (again see 
Hopkins). 
                                                          
15 Hopkins, H.D., International Management Review, 2008) 
16 Hayakawa, K., Kimura, F. and Lee, H., The Developing 
Economies, 2012 
17 Burger, M. and Ianchovichina, E., Review of World 
Economics, 2017 
Research limitations   
This research is not without its limitations. 
Results could be enhanced by expanding the 
sample to better understand the impact of 
industry and nation on acquisition 
performance, as the current model only gives 
a general indication of directionality. 
Furthermore, while ROA is commonly used to 
measure acquisition success, results should 
be corroborated by additional performance 
measures (see below). Finally, further 
research should be conducted to understand 
possible causes of the negative effect of an 
improvement in external conflict risk rating on 
performance of firms whose ROA was seen to 
decrease after the acquisition. 
The choice of ROA as the dependent variable 
could be a limitation. Accounting rules may 
distort results, while accounting measures may 
be manipulated, which is particularly relevant 
for Russia, where the enforcement of 
accounting rules is sometimes viewed as less 
rigorous. As insights gathered were limited, 
given that only one measure of performance, 
ROA, was used, future research should 
expand the number of variables examined. In 
addition, while it is considered that a time 
frame of two years after the acquisition would 
be sufficient, it would be interesting to extend it 
to three years and more, as it is possible that 
in some cases more than two years is needed 
to observe acquisition success. The problem 
of such an extension is that the deal itself may 
become an insignificant driver of the ROA of 
the firm as compared to other business 
factors. 
More generally, when looking at deal ‘success’ 
it is common to look at short-term abnormal 
performance of the acquirer’s shares around 
the announcement of the acquisition. The 
advantages of such an approach are that the 
impact of the deal itself is almost certainly the 
main driver of the share price in the time 
period and the independence from accounting 
vagaries. The obvious weaknesses of such an 
approach are that it assumes the efficiency of 
E 
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capital markets and ignores the impact on 
share prices of risk arbitrage. 
Practical implications  
This paper has implications for foreign 
investors in Russia, and likely in other 
countries where ‘soft’ factors may be holding 
back corporate investors. While it is important 
to be aware of host country risk levels, they do 
not seem to be the key determinant of post-
acquisition success. This would suggest that 
acquirers would obtain better results through a 
coherent acquisition and integration strategy, 
and should not overestimate the impact of 
political risk factors. 
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Our approach 
hree categories of variables were 
selected for the deals. The first 
consisted of all twelve components of 
the ICRG political risk ratings for Russia. 
Secondly, control variables, including Russian 
economic and financial ICRG risk ratings, as 
well as deal specific variables, namely acquirer 
industry and nation, were added. Thirdly, the 
acquisition success was measured from 1998 
to 2014 by the acquirers’ change in return on 
assets, considered within a 2-year time 
horizon before and after the acquisition. Two 
linear regression analyses were conducted 
(with the two year and four year time horizons) 
with the IBM SPSS statistical tool. 
Political risk variables 
Firstly, the independent variables to account 
for country-specific political risk were defined. 
This study used Russia’s political risk rating 
components measured by the ICRG as 
independent variables except where noted. 
These are: 
- Government stability 
- Socioeconomic conditions 
- Investment profile 
- Internal conflict  
- External conflict  
- Corruption 
- Military in politics  
- Religious tensions  
- Law and order 
- Ethnic tensions 
- Democratic accountability 
- Bureaucracy quality – did not vary over 
the time period so excluded 
The lower the specific risk, the higher the 
rating. Monthly data were obtained from the 
Nexis database and subsequently converted to 
yearly figures by means of a simple 12- month 
average. The time horizon covered was 1998 
to 2016. The specific timeframe was selected 
to capture potential variations between the 
period preceding and following Putin’s rise to 
power as Russia’s president in May 2000. 
Control variables 
To account for alternative explanations of 
variations in post-acquisition performance 
brought on by specificities of the deal or other 
macro-economic conditions, a set of control 
variables was added. Deal-specific variables 
included: 
- Acquirer’s nation  
- Acquirer’s industry 
- Relatedness of acquirer and target 
industries19 
Macro-economic variables were comprised of 
economic and financial risk ratings, as 
measured by the ICRG, to help account for the 
impact of other risk factors on M&A 
performance. Financial and economic 
variables were aggregated in a similar way to 
the political risk variables, measuring changes 
in years t-/+1 and t-/+2. 
In line with the World Bank’s methodology 
(2017), the data were transformed prior to 
running the analysis by removing outliers to 
yield more significant results: 
- 10 observations with the lowest ROA 
were removed from the sample 
- 10 observations with the highest ROA 
were removed from the sample 
This left a total sample of 92 observations for 
each period. Furthermore, the ROA was 
squared to obtain a more statistically 
significant model (Elfakhani and Mackie). 
While it is still possible to obtain directionally 
significant results through such an approach 
its interpretation is more complex. However, 
the focus of our analysis was on what does 
and what does not drive M&A performance, as 
opposed to the direction of such changes, and 
thus is not included. 
                                                          
19 Grigorieva, S. and Petrunina, T., Journal of Management 
Control, 2015 argued that changes in performance may be 
partially dependent on industry trends 
T 
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Appendix
As an initial step to gathering data, a list of deals was obtained from Thomson One Banker and 
cross-checked with SDC Platinum. The search criteria were the following: 
 
1.   Transactions where the acquirer was not from the Russian Federation, but the target was, to 
include cross-border deals only. 
2.   Date effective / unconditional between 01/01/1998 and 01/01/2015, to allow the gathering of 
ROA data 2 years after the acquisition. 
3.   Friendly or neutral deal attitude, as hostile deals may have a heightened negative effect on 
performance and may take longer than two years to complete, leading to biased results. 
4.   Acquisition of majority interest as the form of the deal, where the acquirer fully takes control 
of the target. 
 
Figure 5: Construction of sample 
Request Operator Description Results 
 
Database 
 
Acquirer nation 
 
Include 
 
Exclude 
 
All M&A 
 
Russian Federation 
 
n/a 
 
593,597 
Target nation Include Russian Federation 2,244 
Date effective/unconditional Between 01/01/1998 to 01/01/2015 1,867 
Deal attitude Include Friendly, Neutral 1,816 
Form of deal Include Acquisition of majority 
interest 
666 
SUB-TOTAL   666 
 
Acquirers 
 
Exclude 
 
Serial acquirers 
 
438 
Acquirers Exclude Soviet Union 437 
SUB-TOTAL   437 
 
Acquirers 
 
Exclude 
 
Missing/incomplete data 
 
112 
TOTAL   112 
Source: Cass Business School 
 
For these search criteria, 666 deals were obtained, with the number of deals observed at each 
step shown in the figure above. In addition, all observations involving an acquirer who performed 
more than one acquisition in Russia during the timeframe examined were removed. This was 
done as serial acquirers tend to perform better than their less experienced equivalents, especially 
if we consider country-specific knowledge, which could bias results, and also as the performance 
of these deals may overlap. After removing 229 observations, 437 deals remained. 
As a next step, ROA data for the acquirers was gathered from Thomson One, Orbis and 
Bloomberg. All observations where the ROA data was either missing or incomplete were 
subsequently removed, leaving a final sample of 112 observations. 
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